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ABSTRACT 
This study considers heterogeneous effects of reviews and social interactions on diffusion or 
contagion of new products in a networked setting, using a sample of interconnected public user 
profiles from the Steam Community. Ownership and reviews of two cult hit independent games 
– The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth, and To the Moon – are analyzed over a period of four years. 
This data was fit with a Hawkes Process Hazard Regression Model with exponential decay 
kernels for each game, yielding estimates of scale and duration of incremental heterogeneous 
actions within the network. This analysis finds strong, short term, additive, and marginally 
decreasing, social contagion effects from other users buying games, with much smaller, but also 
far more durable and highly significant, effects from review posting behavior in the network, 
independent of review quality. This seems to suggest that review influence, while still 
distinguishable from network homophily, is unlikely to lead to cascade effects.  
Keywords: Information, Contagion, Cascades, Diffusion, Hawkes 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, online ratings and reviews are a driving force in consumers’ decision 
processes. Whether considered as their own feature or a new form of the nebulous “word-of-
mouth” marketing concept, ratings present complex mechanics and a unique challenge for 
researchers and marketers. Although many studies have been written on the topic of review 
lifecycles and effects, and some key results have been consistent across studies, others are still 
contradictory. A much smaller and more recent body of research has considered micro-level 
networked effects to explain heterogeneity in macro-level results. This paper’s main goal is to 
offer a contribution to this group, using a rich data source and cutting-edge methods of social 
contagion research. 
So far, research on product reviews has unearthed a few key results. First, we know that 
reviews are good predictors of product sales, even if not all studies agree that they drive sales. 
Second, we know that reviews exhibit consistent trends across product categories, although there 
are contradictory results for what causes those trends. Third, and perhaps most important, we 
know that reviews can be easily manipulated or moved by social contagion. To quote Sinan Aral 
(2014):  
“Digging deeper into the behavioral mechanisms explaining our results, we found that 
friends were quicker to herd on positive ratings and to come to their friends’ rescue when 
those friends’ ideas were poorly rated. This implies that the structure of social networks 
helps guide the structure of ratings bubbles.” 
In view of the vulnerability of aggregate reviews to network biases and external actors, it 
is in the interest of firms to learn more about the mechanisms behind product opinion diffusion, 
whether to prevent manipulation or to design more effective targeting strategies. However, that is 
not the end of the usefulness of the topic. The diffusion of reviews is essentially the diffusion of 
opinions, and much of the research behind the mechanisms of said diffusion can be generalized 
to propagation of false news, opinion-forming behavior in social media, thought bubbles, and 
permeability of networks to third-party influence. 
As interesting as opinion contagion can be, many of its features remain understudied, 
such as heterogeneity in network effects. Although researchers have studied product diffusion in 
networks and opinion forming behavior in social media, those two areas have rarely come 
together. One of the main obstacles to this type of study is acquiring the right type of data. 
Another is choosing the theoretical framework with which to model it. Product sales data can 
portray the moment of purchase, and that information may be combined with either actual 
network data or network inference statistical models, but for most product categories the 
propagation of reviews itself is not observable. On the other hand, research using social media 
posts or community forum data can portray the behavior of the reviews themselves, but the 
moment of purchase remains unobserved. Thanks to this, for the most part opinions and sales 
remain separate in networks. There are a variety of jargons and popular models available for how 
to model these processes. Survival theory, marketing science, epidemiology, network theory, 
graph theory, control theory, neuroscience, and information economics, all offer different 
focuses, models, and methods when investigating information diffusion, contagion, or cascades. 
This study attempts to bring some of those fields together with a uniquely rich dataset. It 
employs public data from a social network for gamers, sampling for two games: The Binding of 
Isaac: Rebirth, and To the Moon. For each user in the sample, variables include games owned, 
friends, reviews posted, and dates for first achievement earned in the two games as well as 
reviews postings. Models fit to this data at the individual user level estimate the scale and 
duration of effects from users buying and reviewing games on the buying behavior of 
surrounding users, which might not be discernible at the aggregate level. This granular approach 
allows the model to account for cascading effects and clustering behavior in dense areas of the 
network beyond baseline cumulative effects of diffusion. The key modelling assumption behind 
this analysis is that the behavior of users buying games in the immediate network may represent 
social contagion and serve as a proxy for homophily effects, that is, effects due to inherent 
similarities between users in the cluster, while effects of subsequent review-posting behavior are 
independent of any homophily captured in the first effect, and represent only social contagion. 
While games with larger marketing efforts might have any number of confounding unobservable 
effects behind user acquisition, The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth and To the Moon are small 
independent productions with little dedicated marketing that spread mainly through word-of-
mouth and recommendations in the Steam platform itself. In these cases, any other external 
effects might be summarized under network homophily. Given these assumptions, this study 
finds comparable effects across games which go beyond those estimated by a more traditional 
proportional hazard (or logistic) regression. 
A second motivation behind this study is to address a current practical concern in the 
platform from which the data was sampled. Valve Corporation’s Steam is a crossbreed of store, 
media library and social network, and, as most social networks, it has recently come under 
scrutiny for thought bubbles and other forms of undesirable network clustering. Throughout 
2017, Steam has had to deal with multiple illegal or undesirable practices being adopted by both 
consumers and game studios, such as users protesting practices of gaming companies by mass-
publishing negative reviews which drown reviews that better represent the quality of the game 
itself, and with game developers banning and harassing users who publish truthful but negative 
reviews, or with some even using review bots to automatically publish dozens of positive 
reviews to embellish a game’s store page. Although both the website and the app have received 
multiple updates and new features that attempt to discourage these behaviors, there are no 
publicly disclosed estimates of the extent of the consequences of such actions. The experiments 
used in this study are similar to those previously used in the study of cheating behavior 
(Blackburn et al. 2011), and could be extended to analyze other aspects of social contagion on 
Steam. Despite the heavily theoretical approach, this study hopes to offer insights that might be 
useful for buyers   and sellers in the market, if not for the company itself. 
Literature Review 
The digital revolution introduced many new product diffusion channels in the business 
landscape, and the constantly evolving digital markets require unique marketing strategies and 
sales structures. User ratings are among the unique traits of digital commerce, and present distinct 
challenges that researchers have attempted to solve. In the last dozen years, a large body of research 
in marketing science, information technology, and information economics has formed around 
modelling the effects of ratings – or how ratings affect sales and product lifecycles – and modelling 
the social dynamics of ratings – or how ratings come into being in the first place. 
Wendy Moe and Michael Trusov’s own literature review (2011) summarizes well the key 
findings by the group of researchers studying the lifecycles and effects of ratings: 
“The majority of research in this area has identified three metrics of online word of mouth: 
valence, variance, and volume (…) Valence is represented most frequently by an average 
rating measure (…) The variance in ratings has also been measured in a variety of ways, 
ranging from a statistical variance (…) to entropy (…), and volume is represented most 
commonly by the number of postings.” 
Although this basic theoretical model has been stable, studies have commonly found 
conflicting evidence in their experiments. While all agree that ratings are strongly correlated with 
sales, some studies suggest that volume is the most impactful metric for sales (Liu 2006; Duan, 
Gu, and Whinston 2008), but others claim that valence and variance are more meaningful for 
growth rates (Clemons, Gao, and Hitt 2006). Furthermore, studies have not been able to 
indisputably distinguish if higher ratings cause higher sales, or if they are indeed caused by 
superior product quality – which could drive sales by itself. This last distinction would inform the 
most important practical question of ratings: how marketers and platforms should monitor and 
seek to affect or protect ratings. If ratings are irrelevant in light of a product’s quality, they serve 
as little more than predictors of sales. On the other hand, if digital impressions drive sales to any 
extent, platforms and producers should be aware of potential tampering and third-party negative 
campaigns in ratings and reviews. 
Research in this group uses somewhat similar experiments with richer and richer datasets 
to attempt to explain confounding effects. Their data ranges from movies (Liu 2006) to craft beer 
(Clemons, Gao, and Hitt 2006). One of the challenges addressed by some researchers is whether 
those product categories are truly equivalent. Zhu and Zhang (2010), for instance, compared 
ratings and sales across video-games and concluded that the importance of valence versus volume 
versus variance depended on the size of other marketing campaigns and existing expectation ahead 
of launch, with results remaining constant within groups after controlling for that. Similar studies 
have not been conducted for most product categories used in other experiments. 
One of the key results that remains constant across studies is that the lifecycle of ratings 
follows a pattern: ratings get worse over time (Li and Hitt 2008). There is still no consensus over 
whether this is caused by consumers changing their expectations based on previous ratings (Godes 
and Silva 2012) or by the consumer pool itself changing as time goes on (Liu and Hitt 2008). This 
result is one of the first to suggest the existence of systematic bias in reviews and ratings. Schlosser 
(2005) and Amabile (1983) had already examined how negative opinions spread, and suggested 
that consumers’ opinions at large would be driven down by negative opinions of a few early users, 
but these later studies generalized that result for reviews of any valence. Social influences are the 
main topic of Moe and Trusov (2011) as well as Moe and Schweidel (2012), and remain a heated 
topic for marketing research in digital channels. Table 1 is a reproduction of exhibit 1 in Wendy 
Moe and Michael Trusov’s “The Value of Social Dynamics in Online Product Ratings Forums,” 
summarizing key previous studies in the macro analysis of review effects. 
 
Micro-level analysis of reviews has a considerably smaller body of research. Among those 
studies, a key topic is heterogeneity due to network effects, that is the idea that networked 
dynamics behind ratings and opinions may help explain why macro-level studies often get 
conflicting results. Spearheaded by Sinan Aral, this group focuses on studying what form the 
previous results take when examined as a network, not an aggregate, of opinions. Aral’s own 
research can be found on all levels of this, from data collection and experiments (Aral 2016), to 
methodological frameworks (Aral 2009, 2012), to results and caveats (Aral 2011, 2014). Data for 
this type of research is much harder to come by, with very few platforms being able to accurately 
report their users’ connections and many unwilling to do so, which might explain the smaller 
amount of papers published so far. Nonetheless, these frameworks can be useful in explaining 
multiple forms of information propagation, generalizing beyond reviews and ratings to also explain 
thought bubbles and clustering of online communities (Chu and Manchanda 2016). The tools of 
micro-level, networked, analysis can differ greatly from those of macro-level studies. Many 
theoretical works in this field are concerned with adapting tools from Survival, Graph and Control 
Theory to a market context (Dhillon 2013, Gomez-Rodriguez et al 2013, Li et al 2013, Valera and 
Gomez-Rodriguez 2015). The applicability of these methods to multiple contexts has attracted to 
the discussion researchers of many areas previously unrelated to digital ratings. Perhaps the most 
characteristic trait of this body of research is its recency, with even key papers being less than ten 
years old, also meaning that it has not been long enough for more than a few papers to get 
published. It is this subfield, small and recent as it is, that is of most interest to this study. In 
estimating the size of networked shocks, this paper will build upon the work of Gomez-Rodriguez 
et al (2013) and White et al (2016), using a Hawkes-Process-Based Diffusion Model, a popular 
framework for survival theory and modelling pandemics. Furthermore, in considering the source 
of the data, the Steam Community, this study draws inspiration from Blackburn’s “Cheaters in the 
Steam Community Gaming Social Network” (2011), which analyzed social contagion of cheating 
behavior in the Community. Although some research has been done independently by websites 
such as Sergey Galyonkin’s SteamSpy, the Community remains a relatively unused source of 
network data for academic research. 
  
METHODOLOGY 
Data 
This study draws data from public profiles in Valve Corporation’s Steam, a hybrid digital 
store, media platform, and social media for digital games. Using this platform, gamers can buy 
games, manage their collections, publish reviews, share their in-game progress and join 
multiplayer queues with friends. As of January 2017, Steam had a total of 15,624 games in its 
store, with more than 5,000 others added since. In late 2015, Steam had 125 million yearly active 
users. Valve has not reported the same metric since, although it is fair to assume it has grown. 
On the other hand, they have publicly disclosed that in 2017 there were 67 million monthly 
active users on average. Steam collects data on many interactions that would not be observable 
elsewhere, two of which are crucial to this study. First, the Steam Store page for each game 
offers the complete list of reviews for that game, which user published them, at what time, and 
how many users found those reviews useful. Second, all public user pages in the Steam 
Community show that user’s games collection, friend list, and in-game achievements list.  
The sample in this study is based on the first 1000 user reviews from public profiles for 
each game, out of a random sample of 23,890 reviews for The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth, and 
16,649 reviews for To the Moon. A web-scraping crawler then collected data from these 2000 
users and propagated the sample outwards through the public profiles in their friend lists up to 
four degrees of separation, totaling a sample of 409,000 users. Data on each user included 
whether they owned the games, their public friend list, whether they had posted reviews, and the 
date of posting. A first limitation of this analysis is that the date when a user acquired a game is 
not publicly available. On the other hand, achievement lists are readily available. In the context 
of Steam, an “achievement” is a digital trophy given to the user for in-game progression. 
Normally, any user has to play very little to unlock a game’s first achievement, so as long as the 
interval between a user buying a game and playing it for the first time is not too large, the date of 
unlocking the first achievement may serve as a good proxy for acquisition time. To the Moon 
may challenge this assumption as it only gives one achievement, which is awarded for 
completing the game, but its short length (2 to 3 hours) suggests that most users would complete 
the game in a single play session, which would still make the assumption viable. Out of the full 
network sample, more than little more than 15000 owned To the Moon and had a dated 
achievement, while just over 20000 owned The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth and had a dated 
achievement. In other words, this data fully portrays the date of inception of a review, the 
network immediately around it, and any purchases made in that network from then to the present. 
The earliest activity in the sample is in early 2014, while the last one is in early 2018, giving four 
years of activity to analysis. 
Model Building 
One of the oldest and still most commonly used model for studying aggregate sales is the 
Bass Diffusion Model. Developed by Frank Bass in the late 1960s, the key idea behind the Bass 
Model is that individual hazard in product adoption is proportional to the population’s 
cumulative adoption of that product. In general for survival theory, the instantaneous hazard 
function, 𝜆(𝑡𝑖), also called the “intensity function,” is given by 
𝜆(𝑡𝑖) =
𝑓(𝑡)
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
 
 In simple terms, 𝜆(𝑡𝑖) is the probability of an event happening at time 𝑡𝑖 given that it has not 
happened yet. In the Bass Model, this can be fully written as 
𝜆(𝑡𝑖) =
𝑓(𝑡)
1 − 𝐹(𝑡)
= 𝑝 + 𝑞𝐹(𝑡) 
where p is a baseline value that stays constant over time, commonly called the “innovation 
coefficient,” and q is a constant being multiplied by the CDF, informally known as the “imitation 
coefficient.” This leads to a CDF of the form 
𝐹(𝑡) =
1 − 𝑒−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑡
1 +
𝑞
𝑝 𝑒
−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑡
 
The shape of this function is quasi-sigmoidal. The common intuitive explanation for this is that 
initial adoptions are driven by innovation, with imitation gaining momentum as the total number 
of adopters increases. The graphs for hazard and PDF over time can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1: PDF AND HAZARD GRAPHS FOR THE BASS MODEL, WITH DIFFERENT CURVES REPRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF Q AND P OVER TIME 
In general, the Bass Model can characterize aggregate sales sufficiently well, but many 
are skeptical of its inherent biases (Bulte and Lilien 1997, Kumar et al. 2015). Furthermore, 
while the Bass Model is easy to estimate, it is not robust or flexible enough to model individual-
level granular data.  Many models can be constructed for that purpose by combining the baseline 
Bass with covariates and heterogeneous p and q. Hawkes Processes form one family of such 
models. 
Hawkes Processes are a broad class of self-stimulating heterogeneous stochastic process, 
roughly defined by hazard functions of the form  
𝜆(𝑡𝑖) = 𝐴(𝑡𝑖) +  ∑ 𝐵(𝑡𝑖  − 𝑡𝑗)
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖
 
Where 𝐴(𝑡𝑖) is a baseline function and 𝐵(𝑡𝑖  − 𝑡𝑗) is any time-dependent function that portrays a 
hazard shock. A variety of functions may be used in each slot, which leads to Hawkes Processes 
being a broad and unequally studied family of models. Model in this class are similar to a Bass 
Model in that they include two layers of hazard, but instead of having a static baseline, theirs 
may suffer endogenous self-stimulating effects and vary over time, and instead of having a 
momentum term conditional on the CDF, they sum external triggering events individually. 
Besides being a superior tool for modelling heterogeneity, the Hawkes-Process framework 
makes for models that are better at capturing multimodal or hyperdispersed processes, where 
processes either cluster around a few points in time or are spread far apart. Although Hawkes-
Process-Based Models are very popular in survival theory, they are not as present in marketing 
or economics, despite the efforts of some scholars (Valera and Gomez- Rodriguez 2015, Gomez-
Rodriguez, Leskovec & Schölkopf 2013, Li et al 2013). 
This study starts with a more traditional Hawkes Process formulation, where 𝐴(𝑡𝑖) is a 
static baseline diffusion probability 𝜇, and 𝐵(𝑡𝑖  − 𝑡𝑗) is an exponential decay function, but opts 
to parametrize B by a scale parameter 𝛼 and a duration parameter 𝛽 independently, where many 
formulations in the family define a single parameter to facilitate estimation. Furthermore, the 
parameters for external shocks are independent for the first 20 game acquisitions by surrounding 
users as well as the first 10 reviews among those users, and no shocks for the entire network are 
considered. That is, for this Hawkes-Process-Based Contagion model (HPC), the hazard rate of 
an event happening at time 𝑡𝑖 for a user who has witnessed d events at times 𝑡𝑗  {0 < 𝑗 < 𝑖} in the 
immediate vicinity of his network, is:  
𝜆(𝑡𝑖) = 𝜇 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑒
−𝛽𝑗(𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗)
𝑑
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖 
 
In other words, each user’s probability of buying the game in each day is a combination of the 
baseline process (each user’s isolated adoption probability) with external shocks from friends 
purchasing the game or posting reviews. To estimate the parameters 𝜇, 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖  {𝑖 ≤ 30}, one may 
use maximum log-likelihood. A simple survival analysis log-likelihood equation is  
𝑙 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿 = log(𝜆(𝑡𝑛)) − Λ(𝑡𝑛) = log(𝜆(𝑡𝑛)) − ∫ 𝜆(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡𝑛
0
 
For each user who bought the game, where 𝑡𝑛 is the time in which the purchase took place. If 𝛿𝑖 
is an indicator for whether the ith user bought the game, and substituting for the specific hazard 
function of the HPC yields 
𝑙 = ∑ log (𝜇 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑒
−𝛽𝑗(𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗)
𝑑
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖 
)
𝑖:𝛿𝑖=1
− ∑ ∫ [𝜇 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑒
−𝛽𝑗(𝑢−𝑡𝑗)
𝑑
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖 
] 𝑑𝑢
𝑡𝑖
0𝑖:𝛿𝑖=1
 
= ∑ log (𝜇 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑒
−𝛽𝑗(𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗)
𝑑
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖 
)
𝑖:𝛿𝑖=1
− ∑ [𝜇𝑡𝑖 + ∑ (
𝛼𝑗
𝛽𝑗  
(1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝑗(𝑡𝑖−𝑡𝑗)))
𝑑
𝑗:𝑗<𝑖 
]
𝑖:𝛿𝑖=1
 
This equation presents a complex and flat decision surface, quickly degenerates when β<α , and 
has a total of 61 parameters for its 30 dimensions, leading to slow and computationally expensive 
estimation, as is the case for many Hawkes Process models. Nonetheless, over multiple iterations 
of a Nelder-Mead simplex solver, it is possible to estimate recurring maximum estimations. The 
seminal paper on the theory of Hawkes MLE is T. Ozaki’s (1979), but many other theoretical 
investigations of the complexities and alternatives in estimating the parameters of Multivariate 
Hawkes Processes were described by authors since, such as Liniger (2009), Laub et al (2015), 
Etesami et al (2016), Guo and Luk (2013). To simplify estimation in this case, a preliminary 
aggregate level model was used for feature selection. The bass model reduced to a logistic 
distribution when p=0, so a logistic regression was fit to verify the significance of the jth friend 
buying a game or posting a review for predicting whether users acquire the game by the last 
moment observed. 
Model Results 
 First, graphs for the probabilities of a user owning The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth, or To 
the Moon, conditional on the number of friends who own the game and have posted reviews, are 
given in Figures 2 to 5. 
   
FIGURE 2: THE BINDING OF ISAAC, P(OWNING GAME| FIGURE 3: THE BINDING OF ISAAC, P(OWNING GAME| 
NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO OWN THE GAME) BY NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO HAVE REVIEWED THE GAME)  
 NUMBER OF FRIEND WHO OWN GAME BY NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO HAVE REVIEWED THE GAME 
 
 FIGURE 4: TO THE MOON, P(OWNING GAME| FIGURE 5: TO THE MOON, P(OWNING GAME| 
NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO OWN THE GAME) BY NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO HAVE REVIEWED THE GAME)  
 NUMBER OF FRIEND WHO OWN GAME BY NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO HAVE REVIEWED THE GAME 
These graphs suggest roughly decreasing additive increments for both variables on both games, 
with more volatility for higher values of the variables – probably due to the small numbers of 
users with those network characteristics. For modelling, users with more than 20 friends who 
own the game and 10 friends who have posted reviews are considered outliers, and only 
increments up to that size are considered. To justify this threshold, data was modelled in 
aggregate using logistic regressions. Tables 2 and 3 give model estimates for both games with 
linear increments for both variables. Effects for friends’ acquisitions and reviews are positive and 
highly significant, with larger effects for reviews. 
 
TABLE 2 : THE BINDING OF ISAAC, LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH TABLE 3: TO THE MOON, LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH LINEAR  
 LINEAR INCREMENTS INCREMENTS  
As an alternative, both models are refit considering nonlinear additive effects. Results for these models 
are given in Tables 4 and 5. 
Variable β SE p-value
Intercept -3.281673 0.008472 <2e-16 
Acquisitions 0.267584 0.00498 <2e-16 
Reviews 0.467534 0.017543 <2e-16 
AIC 138718
Variable β SE p-value
Intercept -3.781663 0.010557 <2e-16 
Acquisitions 0.363608 0.005131 <2e-16 
Reviews 0.62378 0.020717 <2e-16 
AIC 97785
  
TABLE 4 : THE BINDING OF ISAAC, LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH TABLE 5: TO THE MOON, LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH NONLINEAR  
 NONLINEAR INCREMENTS INCREMENTS.  
 These models are superior than the previous at modelling the data as suggested by AIC. Under the 
nonlinear assumption, review effects are smaller than acquisitions. Similar to the conditional 
probabilities, the sequential effects look almost negative quadratic, with the added insight that review 
effects are still significant after the model has accounted for acquisitions. Nonetheless, it is easy to see 
that even after restricting review effects to the tenth occurrence, estimates for the eighth effect 
onwards have large standard errors and smaller levels of significance. Differentiating these effects 
between positive and negative reviews yielded no AIC gains, and weakened estimates. With these 
results verified, the HCM is fit to The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth users using at most 20 acquisitions and 10 
Variable β SE p-value
Intercept -3.5834 0.01054 <2e-16 
Acquisition1 1.13594 0.01931 <2e-16 
Acquisition2 1.66655 0.02857 <2e-16 
Acquisition3 1.82595 0.04253 <2e-16 
Acquisition4 1.98809 0.0583 <2e-16 
Acquisition5 2.1631 0.07579 <2e-16 
Acquisition6 2.19016 0.09741 <2e-16 
Acquisition7 2.16288 0.11643 <2e-16 
Acquisition8 2.04868 0.14705 <2e-16 
Acquisition9 2.46644 0.15646 <2e-16 
Acquisition10 2.41693 0.18714 <2e-16 
Acquisition11 1.95729 0.23698 <2e-16 
Acquisition12 1.87964 0.2617 6.85E-13
Acquisition13 2.40756 0.29199 <2e-16 
Acquisition14 2.3311 0.38825 1.92E-09
Acquisition15 1.72333 0.46732 0.000226
Acquisition16 1.46708 0.45415 0.001236
Acquisition17 1.58724 0.55417 0.004181
Acquisition18 3.05711 0.46071 3.23E-11
Acquisition19 1.93221 0.41567 3.35E-06
Acquisition20 1.98538 0.20748 < 2e-16 
Review1 0.84699 0.02961 < 2e-16 
Review2 1.08985 0.06458 < 2e-16 
Review3 0.70471 0.13541 1.95E-07
Review4 0.38113 0.21411 0.075069
Review5 0.93617 0.27908 0.000795
Review6 0.6955 0.41508 0.093817
Review7 1.14835 0.45198 0.011063
Review8 1.29033 0.51131 0.011617
Review9 -0.7443 1.04555 0.476546
Review10 1.11076 0.49055 0.023556
AIC 133577
Variable β SE p-value
Intercept -4.23395 0.01405 < 2e-16 
Acquisition1 1.59636 0.02447 < 2e-16 
Acquisition2 2.39548 0.03398 < 2e-16 
Acquisition3 2.86675 0.04561 < 2e-16 
Acquisition4 2.98193 0.0602 < 2e-16 
Acquisition5 3.36055 0.07172 < 2e-16 
Acquisition6 3.32888 0.08673 < 2e-16 
Acquisition7 3.42372 0.1016 < 2e-16 
Acquisition8 3.49832 0.1243 < 2e-16 
Acquisition9 3.67289 0.12772 < 2e-16 
Acquisition10 3.56437 0.15612 < 2e-16 
Acquisition11 3.69469 0.16762 < 2e-16 
Acquisition12 3.8923 0.18744 < 2e-16 
Acquisition13 3.80754 0.21344 < 2e-16 
Acquisition14 4.12263 0.25201 < 2e-16 
Acquisition15 3.88596 0.26298 < 2e-16 
Acquisition16 4.13261 0.28965 < 2e-16 
Acquisition17 4.44898 0.2905 < 2e-16 
Acquisition18 4.38915 0.31196 < 2e-16 
Acquisition19 4.23699 0.34442 < 2e-16 
Acquisition20 4.1496 0.11995 < 2e-16 
Review1 0.78279 0.03415 < 2e-16 
Review2 0.87319 0.07044 < 2e-16 
Review3 0.90275 0.12785 1.65E-12
Review4 1.0065 0.17625 1.12E-08
Review5 1.07829 0.26366 4.32E-05
Review6 1.55839 0.39737 8.79E-05
Review7 1.03628 0.4412 0.018835
Review8 1.2821 0.58995 0.029761
Review9 2.36941 0.77906 0.002355
Review10 2.68669 0.7927 0.000701
AIC 90658
reviews, with reviews pooled independent of their positivity/negativity. Results for the model with only 
acquisition data are given in Table 6, and for the model with review and acquisition data  in Table 7. 
  
LL 1.56E+15
Intercept 1.00E-06
Variable α β
Acquisition1 2.09E-03 1.41E-02
Acquisition2 4.00E-02 3.96E-01
Acquisition3 1.00E-06 4.35E-06
Acquisition4 5.45E-04 5.50E-04
Acquisition5 2.19E-02 5.29E-01
Acquisition6 4.52E-05 4.00E-03
Acquisition7 4.85E-02 1.03E-01
Acquisition8 4.87E-04 5.86E-04
Acquisition9 4.71E-04 8.02E-03
Acquisition10 6.40E-06 9.81E-05
Acquisition11 4.31E-06 8.56E-05
Acquisition12 4.01E-03 4.27E-02
Acquisition13 6.42E-04 3.30E-03
Acquisition14 1.12E-03 2.09E-03
Acquisition15 9.38E-06 1.50E-05
Acquisition16 4.99E-02 2.46E-01
Acquisition17 2.58E-06 2.95E-06
Acquisition18 1.00E-06 2.80E-01
Acquisition19 1.97E+00 2.67E+00
Acquisition20 2.37E-03 2.45E-02
LL 5.08E+15
Intercept 1.00E-06
Variable α β
Acquisition1 7.90E-02 7.90E-02
Acquisition2 1.27E-02 1.27E-02
Acquisition3 2.80E-06 1.36E-01
Acquisition4 1.10E-06 1.10E-06
Acquisition5 4.65E-02 4.65E-02
Acquisition6 6.38E-01 6.38E-01
Acquisition7 7.06E-02 7.06E-02
Acquisition8 1.02E-06 7.90E-06
Acquisition9 1.11E-01 1.11E-01
Acquisition10 1.79E-01 1.79E-01
Acquisition11 1.57E-05 6.03E-03
Acquisition12 1.35E-01 1.35E-01
Acquisition13 3.19E-06 4.05E-05
Acquisition14 1.16E-06 1.45E-04
Acquisition15 1.28E-06 3.74E-05
Acquisition16 1.41E-03 5.26E-01
Acquisition17 1.19E-06 2.50E-06
Acquisition18 2.50E-03 1.08E-02
Acquisition19 4.10E-06 4.10E-06
Acquisition20 2.68E-06 9.76E-06
Review1 1.46E-02 1.65E-02
Review2 1.00E-06 5.48E-01
Review3 1.04E-06 1.28E-06
Review4 4.00E-03 2.38E-01
Review5 3.76E-02 3.76E-02
Review6 6.00E-04 1.08E-03
Review7 4.69E-05 2.48E-04
Review8 1.00E-06 1.12E-05
Review9 2.90E-03 2.90E-03
Review10 7.64E-03 2.01E-01
TABLE 6: THE BINDING OF ISAAC, MODEL ESTIMATE FOR THE HCM 
WITHOUT REVIEW EFFECTS  
TABLE 7: THE BIDNING OF ISAAC, MODEL ESTIMATE FOR THE 
HCM WITH REVIEW EFFECTS 
A likelihood ratio test confirms a significant improvement by the addition of the 20 
parameters for reviews. Figure 6 displays the decaying effects of the first 20 acquisitions (colors 
in descending order on the right) over a period of 90 days according to the complete model. 
Figure 7 shows the range of the 20 acquisition effects and 10 review effects, with the average 
effects of each category in bold lines.  The main result in these is that acquisition effects have 
larger scale in the short run, but quickly decrease through the first month, while review effects 
are smaller but decay much slower. The acquisition effects fall below those of reviews around 
the 27th day. Next, the HCM is fit to To the Moon, with model summaries in Tables 8 and 9. 
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LL -19452197.56
Intercept 1.00E-06
Variable α β
Acquisition1 1.36E-03 0.0013666
Acquisition2 1.53E-03 0.0015651
Acquisition3 4.80E-05 0.0356417
Acquisition4 1.65E-04 0.0362547
Acquisition5 4.71E-04 0.027908
Acquisition6 7.60E-05 0.0201698
Acquisition7 1.44E-04 0.0179117
Acquisition8 1.87E-05 0.0020917
Acquisition9 1.38E-04 0.0118442
Acquisition10 5.70E-04 0.0006582
Acquisition11 5.34E-04 0.0032265
Acquisition12 2.98E-04 0.0207383
Acquisition13 2.27E-04 0.0018192
Acquisition14 8.62E-04 0.0045375
Acquisition15 1.90E-04 0.0117709
Acquisition16 4.10E-04 0.0090788
Acquisition17 2.04E-04 0.013448
Acquisition18 2.12E-04 0.000535
Acquisition19 1.81E-04 0.0205966
Acquisition20 2.14E-04 0.0085154
Review1 1.01E-04 0.0001008
Review2 2.26E-04 0.0004335
Review3 1.22E-04 0.018974
Review4 1.42E-04 0.0092549
Review5 1.74E-04 0.0055553
Review6 5.16E-05 0.0104224
Review7 1.09E-04 0.0133017
Review8 1.01E-04 0.01051
Review9 1.31E-04 0.005883
Review10 8.24E-05 0.0105595
LL -19460617.3
Intercept 1.00E-06
Variable α β
Acquisition1 1.32E-03 0.0013257
Acquisition2 1.64E-03 0.001648
Acquisition3 3.86E-05 0.0343016
Acquisition4 1.54E-04 0.034108
Acquisition5 4.46E-04 0.0280738
Acquisition6 7.75E-05 0.0209972
Acquisition7 1.75E-04 0.0150106
Acquisition8 1.88E-05 0.0020885
Acquisition9 1.42E-04 0.0114327
Acquisition10 5.25E-04 0.0006966
Acquisition11 4.92E-04 0.0033265
Acquisition12 3.17E-04 0.0207132
Acquisition13 2.15E-04 0.0017017
Acquisition14 8.17E-04 0.0045966
Acquisition15 1.86E-04 0.0117099
Acquisition16 4.20E-04 0.0090356
Acquisition17 2.03E-04 0.0128332
Acquisition18 2.02E-04 0.0005363
Acquisition19 1.75E-04 0.0197339
Acquisition20 2.01E-04 0.0092251
TABLE 8: TO THE MOON, MODEL ESTIMATE FOR THE HCM 
WITHOUT REVIEW EFFECTS 
TABLE 9: TO THE MOON, MODEL ESTIMATE FOR THE HCM WITH 
REVIEW EFFECTS 
For To the Moon, results are similar to the previous. The Likelihood Ratio test suggests 
that the improvement in log likelihood by the addition of the ten review variables is significant. 
Figure 8 displays the decaying effects of the first 20 acquisitions over a period of a year 
according to the complete model. Figure 9 shows the range of the 20 acquisition effects and 10 
review effects, with the average effects of each category in bold lines.  Overall, the effect 
estimates for To the Moon are smaller and last for longer than for The Binding of Isaac. 
Nonetheless, they show a similarity with previous estimates: the acquisition effects show larger 
scale at their inception with quick decays, while review effects are much smaller but last for 
longer. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are incremental effects of friends buying games and posting reviews in the 
immediate network. The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth exhibits larger effects with faster decays, 
characteristic of contagion-based spread, while To the Moon exhibits longer term but smaller 
effects, suggesting a prevalence of endogenous forces on diffusion. These differences are likely 
due to the inherent characteristics of the games: The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth has the benefit of 
a large streaming and speedrunning community, while To the Moon is a one-man project with no 
marketing efforts put into it, produced in a rudimentary game engine. On the other hand, the 
relative sizes of review and acquisition effects are consistent across games: acquisition effects 
are larger and shorter-lived, suggesting that most contagion and homophily-based diffusion is 
captured in those interactions, while review effects are smaller bur far more enduring. This 
suggests that review effects, after accounting for natural network evolution or social contagion, 
are negligible in the short run, but relevant over a long stretch of time, and are more connected to 
a user’s awareness of a game than social imitation. If these results were to hold over a variety of 
games, they would suggest that manipulation of reviews in the short run (whether review 
bombings or inflations) should not by itself strongly affect sales or lead to network-wide 
cascading effects. On the other hand, network behavior of social imitation is proven to be highly 
contagious, and possibly more dangerous, in the short run, leading to cascading effects. 
Limitations and further research 
A logistic regression does well enough predicting the relevance of these effects on a 
single user’s tendency to acquire the game and finds that review data has an incremental effect 
past any network/homophily/diffusion/contagion portrayed by the friends’ data alone. Modelling 
the temporal behavior of The Binding of Isaac: Rebirth and To the Moon players in the network 
using a survival analysis framework gives estimates of the differences in magnitude and duration 
of both friend and review effects. The added detail of these model estimates shows once more 
that Hawkes-Process-based models are powerful tools for modelling social behavior over time. 
However, the computational difficulties of a Hawkes Process approach make a study such as this 
impractical for recurring estimates or larger-scale applications. Before similar studies can gather 
more popularity, further improvements in Hawkes estimation are sorely needed. 
A few other caveats of this study require future research. The first is whether the results 
can be generalized to other games. While the two games chosen proved to have different enough 
scales of diffusion and contagion, they are similarly independent productions. If another study 
were to consider higher-budget games with dedicated marketing efforts, the proportional 
relationship between friends’ acquisitions and reviews might not hold, and shocks external to the 
network, such as negative reviews by popular game reporters or internet personalities, might 
become confounding factors. The second is that by the nature of the model, it is likely that for 
cases in which a user acquires a game, then shortly afterwards posts a review, but where 
neighboring users take a long time to acquire the game, the model would overestimate the 
duration of review effects. Overvaluing the last shock is common for all attribution models. This 
is offset by the nature of a Hawkes Process: the model will only overemphasize the duration of 
one such effect, but not its scale (which would drive likelihood down). The third is that while 
this study comfortably amalgamates contagion and homophily-driven diffusion under the 
acquisition variable, further studies concerned with the negative potential of cascading contagion 
effects should first differentiate between pure homophily and contagion due to friends’ 
acquisitions.  
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